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Abstract. Many protocols that arebased on homomorphic encryption are private
only if a client submits inputs from a limited range S. Conditional disclosure of
secrets(CDS)helpstoovercome thisrestriction.InaCDSprotocol for asetS,the
client obtains server’s secret if and only if the client’s inputs belong to S and thus
theserver canguarditselfagainstmalformed queries.WeextendtheexistingCDS
protocols to work over additively homomorphic cryptosystems for every set from
NP/poly. The new construction is modular and easy to apply. As an example,
we derive a new oblivious transfer protocol with log-squared communication and
a millionaire’s protocol with logarithmic communication. We also implement pri-
vate, universally veriﬁable and robust multi-candidate electronic voting so that all
voters only transmit an encryption of their vote. The only hardness assumption
in all these protocols is that the underlying public-key cryptosystem is IND-CPA
secure and the plaintext order does not have small factors.
Keywords. Conditional disclosure of secrets, crypto-computing, homomorphic
encryption, oblivious transfer, two-party computation.
1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption is a powerful tool that provides efﬁcient private implemen-
tations for many basic operations such as scalar product, oblivious transfer and oblivi-
ous polynomial evaluation. However, basic versions of these protocols without zero-
knowledge proofs of correctness are secure only in a semihonest model, where all
parties submit inputs from a limited range, and are not protected against malicious
behaviour. Consequently, a malicious adversary can completely or partially learn the
secret inputs. Conditional disclosure of secrets [GIKM00,AIR01], also known as input
veriﬁcation gadget [BGN05], is a protection mechanism against such attacks. Unfortu-
nately, current solutions [AIR01,BGN05] are secure only if the plaintext space has a
prime order, whereas most additively homomorphic encryption schemes have a com-
posite plaintext order. We provide the ﬁrst conditional disclosure of secrets protocol
that works in conjunctionwith all currentlyknown additively homomorphicencryption
schemes. Hence, we can efﬁciently and more securely solve many practical problems.
Formally,weconsideronlytwo-partyprotocolsbetweenaclientandaserver,though
our results can be extended to the multiparty setting. At the end of such a protocol the
client should learn the desired value whereas the server should learn nothing. Our main
goalis to achieverelaxed-security;thatis, the protocolmust besecureagainstmalicious
clients and semihonest servers. Such a model is widely used in current cryptographic2 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
literature [NP99,AIR01] and is well-justiﬁed in practical applications: as the number of
possible service providers is relatively small compared to the clients, it is possible to
force semihonest behaviour with auditing. Moreover, service providers must preserve
their reputation and thus they are less likely to act maliciously.
For clarity and brevity, we state our main results in the public key model, where the
client is guaranteed to know a valid secret key and the server knows the corresponding
public key. The choice of the model is not too restrictive: with a proper initialisation
phase all our protocols can be implemented in the standard model, see Sect. 7. On the
other hand, such a model enables to prove security of parallel compositions. Compos-
ability together with our new basic construction leads to a simpler and more modular
way to construct complex protocols. Shortly put, relaxed-securityfollows directly from
the protocol design and there is no need to handcraft the proof. More precisely, we
show how to decompose a protocol into elementary tasks that can be efﬁciently im-
plemented with any additively homomorphic IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, provided
that the plaintext order does not have unknown small factors.
In Sect. 3, we establish basic security notions and derive a necessary machinery to
analyse parallel compositions. The core results of our papers are presented in Sect. 4.
We note that most existing additivelyhomomorphicprotocolsare based on the possibil-
ity of computing the next three basic primitives on ciphertexts: addition of ciphertexts,
multiplicationwith a constant, and disclose-if-equal(DIE).In a disclose-if-equalproto-
col, the server obliviouslyreleases secret β only if the client sends a valid encryptionof
x, where the coefﬁcient x can be freely chosen by the server. The current cryptographic
literature is full of many useful and efﬁcient two-message protocols that are based on
these threeprimitives.Unfortunately,the standardDIEprotocoldeﬁnedsay in [AIR01],
and then used in many subsequent papers, is secure only if the plaintext space has a
primeorderandthus canonlybeusedin conjunctionwith thelifted ElGamalcryptosys-
tem where one has to compute discrete logarithms to decrypt. We provide a new DIE
protocol that works in conjunction with all currently known additively homomorphic
encryption schemes. As a result, we can naturally simplify or extend many protocols
that utilise the DIE functionality, e.g. [AIR01,Ste98,Lip05,BK04,FNP04,LLM05].
The rest of the paper provides many useful applications of these generic building
blocks. In Sect. 5, we present a two-message protocol for conditional disclosure of se-
crets (CDS),wherethe clientlearns a secretβ onlyifhis message qis a validencryption
of x ∈ S, where S is a publicly known set. Hence, the server can use β as a one-time
pad to protect the protocol output, i.e., the client learns nothing unless Decsk(q) ∈ S.
The latter forms a basis of the CDS transformation that can guard any two-message
protocol, where the ﬁrst message is a vector of ciphertexts, against malicious clients.
A slightly extended CDS construction provides an efﬁcient solution to the millionaire
problem and conditional oblivious transfer. Another extension of CDS provides a way
to implement electronic voting and auctions without non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs in the multi-party setting using threshold-decryption. Finally, we compare our
results with conventional cryptographic methods to provide some interesting insights
and show the theoretical signiﬁcance of our results, see Sect. 7.
History. The new DIE protocol, together with the CDS protocol and the CDS transfor-
mation date from August 2004 and has been available on eprint since 2005.A New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 3
2 Cryptographic Preliminaries
Distributions. For a a ﬁnite set X, let U(X) denote the uniform distribution over
X and x ← X denote a uniform draw from X. Two distributions D1 and D2 over
a discrete support X are statistically ε-close, D1
ε ∼ D2, if their statistical difference
maxS⊆X |Pr[D1 ∈ S] − Pr[D2 ∈ S]| ≤ ε. A shorthand D1 ≡ D2 denotes D1
0 ∼ D2.
Homomorphic encryption. A public-key cryptosystem π is deﬁned by three algo-
rithms. A key generation algorithm Gen returns a secret and public key pair (sk,pk).
Corresponding Encpk(·) and Decsk(·) algorithms are used to encrypt and decrypt mes-
sages. Let M and C denote the correspondingmessage and ciphertext spaces. Then we
require Decsk(Encpk(x)) = x for every x ∈ M and assume that there exists efﬁcient
membership test for the ciphertext space C. Privacy of encrypted messages is guaran-
teed by IND-CPA security. For any stateful probabilistic algorithm A, its IND-CPA
advantage quantiﬁes the ability to distinguish ciphertexts:
Adv
IND-CPA
π (A) = 2 ·
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
Pr
"
(sk,pk)←Gen,(x0,x1)←A(pk),i ← {0,1}
c ← Encpk(xi) : A(x0,x1,c) = i
#
−
1
2
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
,
where the probability is taken over coin tosses of all relevant algorithms. A cryptosys-
tem π is (ε,τ)-IND-CPA-secure if Adv
IND-CPA
π (A) ≤ ε for any τ-time adversary A.
A cryptosystem π is additively homomorphic, if M = ZN for some N, and for any
(sk,pk) ← Genandvalidmessagesx1,x2 ∈ MthedistributionofproductsEncpk(x1)·
Encpk(x2) coincides with the distribution of ciphertexts Encpk(x1 +x2). To be precise,
the equivalence
Encpk(x1) · Encpk(x2) ≡ Encpk(x1 + x2)
must holdforanyﬁxedciphertextEncpk(x1). That is, givenEncpk(x1)·Encpk(x2), even
anunboundedadversarylearnsnothingbeyondx1+x2.A cryptosystemπ is multiplica-
tively homomorphic,if Encpk(x1)·Encpk(x2) ≡ Encpk(x1·x2) for any (sk,pk) ← Gen
and x1,x2 ∈ M, where M is a multiplicative group where computing the discrete
logarithm is hard. In many practical applications, multiplicatively homomorphic cryp-
tosystems Enc are converted to additively homomorphic cryptosystems Enc by using
the lifted encryption rule Encpk(x) := Encpk(gx). Such lifted cryptosystems have re-
duced utility, as the new decryption rule requires computation of discrete logarithms
and one can successfully decrypt only a small fraction of ciphertexts.
Many well-known homomorphic cryptosystems are IND-CPA secure under rea-
sonable complexity assumptions, e.g. [Elg85,Pai99,DJ01]. Existing additively homo-
morphic cryptosystems have a composite plaintext order with large factors. For exam-
ple, the plaintext order of the Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99] is an RSA modulus and
thus its smallest prime factor is approximately
√
N. The Goldwasser-Micali cryptosys-
tem [GM82] is the only known exception, as it is additively homomorphic over Z2.
Such plaintext space is too small for many applications. All known cryptosystems with
a largeprimeplaintextorderaremultiplicative,e.g.,theElGamal cryptosystem[Elg85].4 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
3 Basic Properties of Two-Message Protocols
Throughoutthe paper, we consider two-message protocols where a client sends a query
q to a server that replies with a, and then the client computes a desired output from
a. The server should learn nothing about the query. The client should learn f(α,β),
whereα denotesclient’s privateinputvectorandβ denotesserver’sprivateinputvector.
Mostly, we consider the relaxed-security against unbounded clients and computation-
ally boundedservers, but sometimes we consider also the setting where both parties are
computationally bounded. A protocol is correct if the client always recovers f(α,β)
when both parties are honest. A priori we do not assume correctness from all protocols,
as sometimesit is sufﬁcientto knowthat a client cannotlearnanythingbeyondf(α,β).
In the simplest case, the query q consists of encrypted inputs (α1,...,αm) and the
server uses properties of additively homomorphic encryption to compose an appropri-
ate reply.We call such protocolsadditively homomorphictwo-message protocols. Here,
we explicitly assume that the server knows public key pk and thus can efﬁciently ver-
ify that the query consists of valid ciphertexts and ignore malformed queries. Notably,
many interesting tasks can be solved with additively homomorphictwo-message proto-
cols. Computationally-private information retrieval [AIR01,Ste98,Lip05], solutions to
millionaire’s problem [BK04,Fis01], and various protocols for privacy-preserving data
mining tasks [FNP04,WY04,GLLM04] form only a small set of such protocols.
Relaxed-security in the PKI model. As usual, we deﬁne security by comparing the
real and ideal model. However, we explicitly assume that the client knows the secret
key, the server knows the corresponding public key and only the client can deviate
from the protocol speciﬁcation. Formally, a trusted key generator initially runs the key
generation algorithm Gen for a cryptosystem π, and then privately sends (sk,pk) to the
client and pk to the server. In particular, the server knows that pk corresponds to this
ﬁxed client. This key pair is then possibly used in many different protocol runs.
Note that the PKI model is normal and even desirable in many applications, e.g.
e-voting. Still, we stress that we use the PKI model only for the sake of simplicity of
security proofs. In Sect. 7, we show how to replace the trusted key generator by a key
transfer protocol with a marginal degradation of security.
Since the server obtains no output and is always semihonest, we can decompose
the standard security deﬁnition into two orthogonal requirements: client-privacy and
server-privacy. A two-message protocol is (ε,τ)-client-private, if for any τ-time state-
ful adversary A, the next inequality holds:
2 ·
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
Pr
"
(sk,pk)←Gen,(α0,α1)←A(pk),
i ← {0,1},q ← qpk(αi) : A(α0,α1,q) = i
#
−
1
2
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
≤ ε ,
where qpk(αi) denotes the ﬁrst message computed by the honest client. Server-privacy
has a slightly more complicated deﬁnition, since we must transform any efﬁcient ad-
versary from the real world to an efﬁcient adversary in the ideal model, where a trusted
third party(TTP) computesf(α,β). Hence, the deﬁnitionincorporatesa simulatorSim
and a distinguisher B and we need to explicitly quantify their efﬁciency. The simulatorA New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 5
Sim gets (sk,q) as an input and can send α∗ once to the TTP. Then Sim obtains the
value of f∗ = f(α∗,β) and can proceed with the simulation. For brevity, let us deﬁne
pr = Pr[(sk,pk)←Gen,(β,q)←A(sk),a ← apk(q,β) : B(β,q,a) = 1] ,
pi = Pr[(sk,pk)←Gen,(β,q)←A(sk),ˆ a ← Simsk(q,f
∗) : B(β,q,ˆ a) = 1] ,
where a(q,β) denotes the answer of the honest server with the input β to the query
q. A protocol implements (τ,δ,t,ε)-server-privately a function f, if for any τ-time
adversary A there exists a (t + δ)-time simulator Sim such that |pr − pi| ≤ ε for any
t-time distinguisher B. In the information-theoretical setting, algorithms A, Sim and
B are unbounded. A protocol is ε-server-private if for any adversary A there exists a
simulator Sim such that their output distributions are statistically ε-close. We say that a
protocol is (ε1,τ;ε2)-relaxed-secure if it is (ε1,τ)-client-private and ε2-server-private.
Relaxed-security is widely used standard security assumption, see [NP99,AIR01].
Extractabilityandsimulatability. Usually,theclient-privacyfollowsdirectlyfromse-
curity assumptions. For example, additively homomorphic protocols are client-private
by the construction, provided that the cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure. Proofs of
server-privacy can be signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed by considering the following notions of
extractability and simulatability. As client can be malicious, the simulator Sim must
somehow deduce the intended input α∗. In the PKI model, the simulator can use sk to
determine the input α∗ directly from q. A two-message protocol is extractable if there
exists an efﬁcient algorithm Extsk(·) such that Extsk(qpk(α)) = α for all valid inputs
and Extsk(q) = ⊥ for all invalid queries q that do not correspond to any input.
In many protocols, the server’s reply can be perfectly or almost perfectly simulated
knowing only the corresponding client’s output f∗ and a secret key sk. We formalise
this as simulatability. Consider a protocol transcript (q,a) between the honest client
and server. Let f∗ = f(α,β) be the corresponding client’s output. Then the server’s
reply is ε2-simulatable if there exists an efﬁcient algorithm Sim
∗
sk such that the output
distributions (q,a) and (q,ˆ a) are statistically ε2-close even for a ﬁxed q, where ˆ a ←
Sim
∗
sk(q,f∗). The notion of (t,ε2)-simulatability is deﬁned analogously. Extractability
together with simulatability implies server-privacy:
Theorem 1. If a two-message protocol is extractable, ε2-simulatable and the server
ignoresmalformedqueries,thentheprotocolis alsoε2-server-privateinthePKImodel.
Proof. We construct a universal simulator Sim as follows. If the query q is malformed
thenthe simulator ignoresit. Otherwise,Sim extractsthe intendedinputα∗ ← Extsk(q)
and sends α∗ to the TTP. Given the reply f∗ = f(α∗,β) from the TTP, the simulator
uses Sim
∗
sk(q,f∗) to simulate the reply ˆ a. Since malformed queries are discarded in
both worlds, the distributions (β,q,a) and (β,q,ˆ a) are statistically ε2-close. u t
Forked composition. We can use Thm. 1 to prove that a parallel composition of ex-
tractable and simulatable protocols preserves server-privacy.It makes sense to consider
protocols that share the query phase as we can always merge different queries into a
single query.Let two-message protocols Π1,...,Πs share the ﬁrst message q. Then the
forked composition Forked[Π1,...,Πs] is deﬁned as follows:6 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
1. The client computes the query q and sends it to the server.
2. The server uses q to compute replies a1,...,as according to Π1,...,Πs.
3. The server sends a1,...,as to the client.
4. The client computes the private output (f1,...,fs) according to Π1,...,Πs.
It is easy to prove that a client can learn nothing beyond f1(α,β),...,fs(α,β).
Theorem 2. Let Π1,...,Πs be extractable and respectively εi-simulatable implemen-
tations of functionalities fi. Then the composition Forked[Π1,...,Πs] is an extractable
and (ε1 + ··· + εs)-simulatable implementation of the functionality f = (f1,...,fs).
Proof. Extractability is clear. By the deﬁnition of simulatability, there exist simula-
tors Sim
∗
sk,i that output simulated replies ˆ ai such that (q,ai) and (q,ˆ ai) are statisti-
cally εi-close even for ﬁxed q. Now, deﬁne a simulator Sim
∗
sk that given q and f∗ =
(f1(α∗,β),...,fs(α∗,β)) runs Sim
∗
sk,i(q,f∗
i ) for i ∈ {1,...,s} and outputs ˆ a1,...,
ˆ as. By the construction, the distributions (q,a1,...,as) and (q,ˆ a1,...,ˆ as) are statisti-
cally (ε1 + ··· + εs)-close even for a ﬁxed q and the simulatability follows. u t
Reducing communication further with CPIR. In many two-message protocols, the
client must access only a short part of the reply a to recoverthe output f(α,β) whereas
the rest of a consists of random noise. Hence, we can signiﬁcantly decrease the total
communication |q| + |a|, if the client could fetch only useful parts of a. The latter
can be done using computationally private information retrieval (CPIR). In a 1-out-
of-n CPIR protocol, the server maintains a database β = (β1,...,βn) of `-bit strings
and the client can fetch βi so that a computationally bounded server learns nothing.
The basic properties of CPIR protocols are determined by parameters n and `. It is
trivial to achieve communicationcomplexity Θ(n`) just by sending the whole database
so one considers only CPIR protocols with sublinear communication. There is a wide
range of such protocols. Recent protocols achieve communication that is low-degree
polylogarithmic in the database size, see [Lip05,GR05] for further references.
Now, assume that the server’s reply has a structure a = (a1,...,an) and the client
needs to recover at most t elements. Then the client can use t parallel CPIR queries to
fetch desired parts ai1,...,ait. Note that the CPIR queries can be sent together with
the protocol Π messages, provided that the CPIR instance is run independently from Π
or joining queries does not decrease client-privacy. Server-privacy cannot decrease, as
the replies of CPIR queries are computed from the original reply a.
4 Three Basic Crypto-Computing Primitives
“Crypto-computing” is often used to describe two-message protocols, where a server
uses some basic operations on client’s garbled inputs to compute reply that reveals
only f(α,β). The ﬁrst comparative study [SYY99] showed how to crypto-compute
predicates with logarithmic circuit depth using the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
Later, this construction was somewhat generalised to compute the greater-than predi-
cate [Fis01]. Here, we provide three basic crypto-computing primitives for additively
homomorphic cryptosystems with large factors of the plaintext space. Note that theA New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 7
server can crypto-compute ciphertexts of sums and products with one public factor
obliviously from ciphertexts, as
Encpk(x1 + x2) ≡ Encpk(x1) · Encpk(x2) · Encpk(0) (1)
Encpk(x · y) ≡ Encpk(y)x · Encpk(0) (2)
hold by the deﬁnition of additively homomorphic cryptosystems. Here the multiplica-
tion by Encpk(0) is necessary to re-randomise the replies.
But thereis also a thirdgenericoperationthat implicitly“tests” whethera ciphertext
c is an encryption of x. The existence of this operation depends additionally on the
order of the plaintext group. More precisely, a disclose-if-equal (DIE) protocol allows
releasing of a secret β only if Decsk(c) = x where the server can freely choose x. The
idealised functionality of DIE protocol is deﬁned as follows
f(α,β) =
(
β, if α = x ,
⊥, if α 6= x .
The simplest implementation of DIE protocol was given in the paper [AIR01]:
1. The client sends c ← Encpk(α) to the server.
2. If c ∈ C then the server sends a reply a ← (c·Encpk(−x))r ·Encpk(β) for r ← M.
3. The client outputs Decsk(a) = (α − x)r + β.
If the plaintext space has a prime order, then (α − x)r has uniform distribution over
M when x 6= α. Consequently, the protocol is perfectly simulatable: if f(α,β) = ⊥
a simulator should output a random encryption Encpk(m) for m ← M and Encpk(β)
otherwise. Therefore, the basic DIE protocol is also relaxed-secure.
On the other hand, the protocol is not correct, since the client obtains a random
output when Decsk(c) 6= x. If x is public then the correctness is not an issue, as the
client knows whether Decsk(c) = x or not. Otherwise, the construction guarantees only
that the client learns nothing about β when Decsk(c) 6= x. Moreover, if the server sets
the ﬁrst k-bits of β to 0, then the honest client can detect α 6= x with failure probability
2−k, i.e., there is a trade-off between reliability and throughput.
Unfortunately,the basic DIE protocol is not secure if the message space has a com-
posite order. As an example, consider the Paillier cryptosystem, where N = pq is an
RSA modulus. If a malicious client sends c ← Encpk(p + x) then Decsk(a) = β + rp
mod N and the client can recover β mod p although Decsk(c) 6= x. Since the DIE
protocol is a building block in many existing protocols, then such leakage might cause
a domino effect that can completely reveal server’s input. For example, the circuit
CDS protocol in Sect. 5 is extremely vulnerable against such attacks. Therefore, we
devise a new DIE protocol that works in conjunction with all currently known addi-
tively homomorphiccryptosystems. As a result, we can naturally simplify many proto-
cols [AIR01,Ste98,Lip05,BK04,FNP04,LLM05] that use the lifted ElGamal cryptosys-
tem or zero-knowledge correctness proofs to guarantee security of the DIE protocol.
New general construction for DIE. Server-privacy of the basic DIE protocol hinges
on the fact that αZN = {αr : r ∈ ZN} = ZN for any α 6= 0. If the message space8 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
Query phase:
The client sends q ← Encpk(α) to the server.
Transfer phase:
If the ciphertext is invalid q / ∈ C then the server returns ⊥.
Otherwise, the server returns a ← (c · Encpk(−x))
r · Encpk(encode(β)) for r ← M.
Post-processing:
The client computes y = Decsk(a) and returns decode(y).
Protocol 1: Disclose-if-equal protocol of `-bit secrets for the constraint Decsk(q) = x
contains non-trivial additive subgroups (ideals) {0} 6= G ( ZN then the client can
chooseaciphertextc sothatthereplyaenablestorestorethecosetβ+G.Consequently,
a malicious client can learn up to log2 N − log2 Φ bits of information, where Φ is
the minimal size of the non-trivial subgroup G. To seal the leakage, we must use a
probabilistic encoding for β such that the total entropy of G together with the encoding
encode(β) is roughly log2 N. Let us deﬁne an encoding for `-bit strings
encode(β) = β + 2` · t mod N for t ← ZT ,
decode(y) = (y mod N) mod 2
` ,
where T = b2−` · Nc and ` < blog2 Nc. As there are no modular wrappings, the
decoding is always correct. More importantly,Prot. 1 is now secure for small enough `.
Theorem 3. Let π be an additively homomorphic cryptosystem such that the smallest
factor of the plaintext order is larger than γ > 2. Then Protocol 1 for transferring `-bit
strings is extractable and (2`−1/γ)-simulatable.
Proof. Extractability is clear and thus we consider only simulatability. If α 6= x, then
by construction y = encode(β) + g where g is chosen uniformly from a non-zero
subgroup G ⊆ ZN. If G = ZN then y is uniformly distributed over ZN. Otherwise
G can be represented as pZN, where p is a non-trivial factor of N, and y mod p ≡
β + 2` · t mod p, where t ← ZT and T = b2−` · Nc. Since 2 and p are relatively
prime,
￿
2` · t : t ∈ Zp
￿
= Zp and the term 2` · t mod p covers all elements of Zp
almost uniformly. More precisely, the elements of Zp can be divided into two sets:
T0 =
￿
c ∈ Zp : Pr[β + 2
` · t mod p = c] = a
T
￿
with |T0| = p − b ,
T1 =
￿
c ∈ Zp : Pr[β + 2` · t mod p = c] = a+1
T
￿
with |T1| = b ,
where a =
￿T
p
￿
and b = T − ap. Consequently, the statistical difference between y
mod p and the uniform distribution U(Zp) can be expressed as
ε =
|T0|
2
·
￿
1
p
−
a
T
￿
+
|T1|
2
·
￿
a + 1
T
−
1
p
￿
=
b(p − b)
Tp
≤
p
4T
≤
N
4γT
,
as p(p − b) ≤ p2/4 and p ≤ N/γ. Since 2`+1 ≤ N we get T = b2−`Nc ≥ N/2`+1
and thus ε ≤ 2`−1/γ. Now note that the distributionsencode(β)+U(pZN) and U(ZN)A New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 9
are still ε-close, as we can express
Pr[encode(β) + U(pZN) = c mod N] =
p
N
· Pr[encode(β) = c mod p] .
Hence, we can use a simulator Sim
∗
sk(q,f∗) that outputs Encpk(encode(β)) if f∗ = β
and Encpk(m) for m ← ZN otherwise. u t
Corollary 1. Let π be an (τ,ε1)-IND-CPA-secure additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tem such that the smallest factor of the plaintext order is larger than γ > 2. Then
Protocol 1 for transferring `-bit strings is (τ,ε1;ε2)-relaxed-secure for ε2 = 2`−1/γ.
The Maximal Throughput of DIE Protocol. First, note that if we want to achieve
ε-server-privacy then we must choose ` = blog2(2εγ)c, where γ is the lower bound to
non-trivial factors of N. Usually, it is sufﬁcient to take ε = 2−80 and thus N cannot
have smaller factors than 280 if the server wants to release Boolean secrets. For the
Paillier cryptosystem the smallest factor of N is approximately
√
N, and consequently,
one can transfer ` = blog2(2
√
Nε)c ≈ 0.5log2 N + log2 ε bits. For standard 1024-bit
RSA modulus and ε = 2−80, one can take ` = 433.
As our DIE protocol is extractable and simulatable, a forked composition of t pro-
tocols enables transfer of a t`-bit secret, where the achieved server-privacyis
|β|
`γ ·2`−1.
Smaller values of` increase the maximallengthof β but also decrease the ratiobetween
the desired communication |β| and the total communication |q|+|a| and make the pro-
tocol less efﬁcient. In other words, a bad encodingencode(β) with a small capacity can
signiﬁcantly decrease efﬁciency. As our target distribution is U(ZN) then it is straight-
forward to derive entropy bounds for the capacity: H(ZN) ≈ H(encode(β)+pZN) ≤
H(encode(β))+H(pZN) ≤ log2 |encode(β)|+H(pZN), where |encode(β)| denotes
the size of the support. As the encoding must be uniquely decodable, the capacity of
a single reply ` ≤ log2
N
|encode(β)| . minp H(pZn) = log2 Φ, where Φ is the smallest
prime factor of N. Thus, the encoding is optimal up to a constant additive term log2 ε.
The result can be generalised for any target distribution using a more detailed analysis.
5 Generic Construction for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
Many protocols are secure only if client submits inputs α from a limited range S.
Cleverly chosen α / ∈ S can either partially or completely reveal the server’s input β.
Therefore, the server must somehow verify that α ∈ S. Classically, this is done by
a zero-knowledge proof that Decsk(c) ∈ S. However, this either increases the num-
ber of messages or requires a security model with a common reference string or ran-
dom oracles. A conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) reaches the same goal with-
out extra messages and exotic assumptions. In a CDS protocol, the client should learn
a secret β only if Decsk(q) ∈ S, where the query vector q consists of ciphertexts
Encpk(α1),...,Encpk(αm) and the set S is public. Since the server can use β as a
one-time pad to encrypt the original reply a, the client learns nothing about the outputs
of the original protocol if α / ∈ S and the modiﬁed protocol becomes server-private.10 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
A CDS protocol can be straightforwardly constructed as a forked composition of
individual DIE protocols for {Decsk(c) = x}x∈S that share the same secret β but such
compositionis inefﬁcient.Therefore,weshow howtouse Benaloh-Leichtersecret shar-
ing scheme [BL88] together with slightly extended DIE protocols to achieve a more
computation and communication efﬁcient CDS protocol (circuit CDS).
Conjunctive afﬁne zero tests. First, we present an optimisation for speciﬁc sets. Re-
call that our DIE protocol is secure since encode(β) + U(G)
ε ∼ U(ZN) if G 6= {0}.
Similarly, we can construct CDS protocols for conjunctive afﬁne zero tests Ψ0(α) = Vv
j=1[
Pm
i=1 sijαi
? =xj], where {xi} and {sij} are public constants:
1. The client sends q = (c1,...,cm) where ci = Encpk(αi).
2. The server halts if some c1,...,cn is not a valid ciphertext, otherwise it replies
a =
Qv
j=1
￿Qm
i=1 c
sij
i · Encpk(−xj)
￿rj · Encpk(encode(β)) for r1,...,rv ← ZN.
3. The client restores y = Decsk(a) and outputs decode(y).
As y =
Pv
j=1 (
Pm
i=1 αisij − xi)rj + encode(β) = encode(β) + G1 + ··· + Gv,
then y = encode(β) + U(G) for a non-zero sub-group G if some zero-tests do not
hold. The latter follows from the fact that r1,...,rv are independently chosen. Hence,
the claims of Thm. 3 hold also for the CDS protocol given above. Of course, when the
plaintext order is prime then there is no need to use probabilistic encoding and we can
use the construction given in [AIR01]. Notably, such simpliﬁed construction has been
used in [BGN05] together with a cryptosystem that has a composite plaintext order.
Paradoxically, the latter construction is still computationally secure, as the client must
compute arbitrary discrete logarithms to recover a coset β + G.
Circuit CDS protocol. For any set S, we can write the predicate ΨS(α) := [α ∈ S]
as a monotonous combination of afﬁne zero tests, i.e., the formula consists of Boolean
operations ∧ and ∨ together with atomic terms Ψ0(α) =
Vv
j=1[
Pm
i=1 sijαi
? =xj]. For
efﬁciency reasons, we might express the input α as a bit-vector. The server can later
use properties of additivelyhomomorphicencryptionto restore the original ciphertexts.
First, the server uses the Benaloh-Leichter secret sharing scheme to assign sub-
secrets βi to eachleaf test Ψ0(α) so that the clientcan reconstructthesecret β ∈ {0,1}
`
if Ψ(α) holds and the secrets of true leaves are revealed. Fig. 1 illustrates how secret
β is propagated through the circuit of Ψ(α) = [α > x] without optimisation. Namely,
the master secret β is assigned to the topmost gate of the circuit. For every ∨-gate,
the output secret is just pushed downwards. For every ∧-gate ψ with u children and
a secret βψ assigned to it, sub-secrets β1,...,βu−1 ← {0,1}
` and βu ← βψ − β1 −
···−βu−1 mod 2` are assignedto the children.One can also use thresholdoperations:
THRv(x1,...,xs) = 0 ifandonlyif at least v valuesxj are equalto1. Fora THRv gate,
generatea random(v−1)-degreepolynomialfψ with fψ(0) = βψ andassign the secret
fψ(i) to its ith child. Finally, the server uses a forked composition of CDS protocols
for leaf tests Ψ0 to release sub-secrets associated to each leaf. The client recomputesthe
secret from leaf values by inversely following the secret generation.A New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 11
∧
[α2
? =x2]
[α1
? =x1]
[α0
? =1]
[x1
? =0]
β1
β 2
β 3
β4
∧
[α2
? =x2]
[α1
? =1]
[x1
? =0]
β5
β
6
β7
∧
[α2
? =1]
[x2
? =0]
β 8
β 9
∨
β
β β
β β = β1 + β2 + β3 + β4
β = β5 + β6 + β7
β = β8 + β9
Fig.1. An unoptimised circuit for Ψ(α) = [α > x] where secrets are pushed down to DIE leafs.
The circuit can be further optimised by replacing ∧-gates with conjunctive afﬁne equality tests
Theorem 4. If the leaf CDS protocol is extractable and ε2-simulatable,then the circuit
CDS protocol for ΨS is extractable and L(ΨS) · ε2-simulatable, where L(ΨS) is the
number of leaves. If the cryptosystem is (τ,ε1)-IND-CPA secure and q consists of m
ciphertexts, then the protocol is (τ − O(1),mε1;L(ΨS) · ε2)-relaxed-secure.
Proof. Given the main secret β it is straightforward to reconstruct the leaf-level se-
crets. Otherwise, if ΨS(α) = 0 then the sub-secrets βi that are assigned to true atoms
Ψ0(α) = 1 are independent and are uniformly distributed. Hence, a world with L(ΨS)
ideally implemented leaf CDS protocols can be perfectly simulated in the world where
β is released only if α ∈ S. Now, the simulatability follows directly from Thm. 2. The
second claim follows from Thm. 1 and the basic properties of IND-CPA encryption.
u t
If the CDS protocol is based on the new DIE protocol, then we can estimate how
manybits are neededto transfer`-bitsecrets. Forthe 1024-bitPaillier cryptosystemand
2−80-sever-privacy, a single ciphertext can ﬁt 393 bits provided that the corresponding
circuit has less than 240 leaves; the message expansion is roughly |a|/` ≈ 5.2 · L(Ψ).
As negations can be expressedby conjunctiveafﬁne zero tests, then they can appear
only in the leaf level, i.e., the formula Ψ(α) must be in a negation normal form (NNF).
Many practically interesting sets have compact NNF-s, but for some circuits Ψ such
normal form is exponentiallylarger. We can circumvent the problem by using auxiliary
inputs w. Consider the circuit representation of Ψ that consists of unary ¬-gates and
binary ∧- and ∨-gates. Denote all output wires of logical gates by auxiliary labels wi.
Now,wecanrepresentassignmentswu ← ws∧wt andwu ← ws∨wt withtheformulae
[wu
? =1] ∧ [ws
? =1] ∧ [wt
? =1] ∨ [wu
? =0] ∧ [ws
? =0] ∨ [wu
? =0] ∧ [ws
? =0] .
[wu
? =0] ∧ [ws
? =0] ∧ [wt
? =0] ∨ [wu
? =1] ∧ [ws
? =1] ∨ [wu
? =1] ∧ [ws
? =1] ,
and wu ← ¬ws as [wu
? =0]∧[ws
? =1]∨[wu
? =1]∧[ws
? =0]. Therefore,we can in principle
construct a new formulaΨ(α,w) in NNF such that Ψ(α) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃w : Ψ(α,w) = 1
and the size of Ψ(α,w) is proportional to the gate count of Ψ(α). Consequently, we
can always construct efﬁcient circuit CDS protocols for efﬁciently recognisable sets.12 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
Query phase:
The client sends q = (c1,...,cm) to the server, where ci ← Encpk(αi) for i ∈ {1,...,m}.
Transfer phase:
The server computes the reply a = (d1,...,dn) according to the original protocol Π
The server applies one-time pad ei ← di · Encpk(ti) for ti ← ZN and i ∈ {1,...,m}.
The server computes the CDS reply acds for Decsk(q) ∈ S with secret a β = t1k...ktm.
The server replies (e1,...,en) and acds.
Post-processing:
The client recovers the secrets ti from acds and computes ˆ di ← ei · Encpk(−ti).
Next, the client proceeds with the original protocol Π.
Protocol 2: CDS transformation for additively homomorphic two-message protocols
CDS Transformation. It is straightforward to use a CDS protocol to transform any
additively homomorphic two-message protocol that is secure in the semihonest model
to a modiﬁed two-message protocol that is relaxed-secure. Let the query q consist of
m ciphertexts (c1,...,cm). Protocol Π is secure in the semihonest model, when there
exist a set of valid inputs S such that the client learns only f(α,β), provided that
Decsk(q) = (α1,...,αm) ∈ S. Let us use a sufﬁciently long secret β as a one-time
pad to decrypt the original reply a and release the secret only if Decsk(q) ∈ S. Then the
corresponding protocol is clearly relaxed-secure. In many cases, the reply a consists of
re-randomised ciphertexts and we can reduce the length of the secret β, see Prot. 2.
Theorem 5. If the two-message additively homomorphicprotocol Π is correct, (τ,ε1)-
client-private and ε2-simulatable for α ∈ S and the CDS protocol for the set S is
ε3-simulatable, then Protocol 2 is correct and (τ,ε1;max{ε2,ε3})-relaxed-secure.
Proof. Due to the re-randomisation,the recovered replies ˆ di have the same distribution
as di, thus correctness is evident. Client-privacy is evident as both protocols share the
query q. For server-privacy, note that if α ∈ S, we can ﬁrst use the original simulator
to simulate di and then apply the CDS transformation to the simulation output. The
correspondingsimulation is ε2-close to the real run, since the original reply is not more
than ε2 away from the simulated one. Otherwise, (e1,...,en) are random ciphertexts
and thus perfectly simulatable. Now if we add a simulated CDS reply ˆ acds, then the
aggregated reply ˆ acds,e1,...,en is ε3-close to the real protocol transcript, as the CDS
is ε3-simulatable. The claim follows, as Decsk(q) is either in S or not. u t
Optimisations. If all replied ciphertexts of the original protocol are in the ﬁxed range,
i.e., Decsk(di) ∈ {0,1}
` then full recovery of ti is not necessary. It is sufﬁcient to send
ti mod 2` togetherwith a extra bit neededto indicate a possible wrappingti ≥ N −2`
and the message expansion rate can be less than L(Ψ). Secondly, note that the commu-
nication overhead of the CDS transformation is linear in |a|. Therefore, the transfor-
mation is quite inefﬁcient when |a| is long. To get better performance, the server can
use symmetric encryption to garble the original reply and a CDS protocol to release the
correspondingkey. The output is still computationally simulatable and thus we achieveA New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 13
computational server-privacy. A block cipher in counter mode is the best encryption
method, as then the client can efﬁciently decrypt only necessary parts of a.
6 Practical Applications of Crypto-Computing Techniques
In this section, we show how to use additively homomorphic two-message protocols
to solve several important cryptographic tasks. Here, the query q is a vector of cipher-
texts, and the reply is computed by combining the identities (1) and (2) with Prot. 1.
Note that the outputs of crypto-computed sums and products are perfectly simulat-
able provided that the end result is re-randomised. Consequently, client-privacy fol-
lows form (τ,ε1)-IND-CPA security and server-privacy follows from the basic proper-
ties of forked composition, see Thm. 1 and 2. Shortly put, the resulting protocols are
(τ − O(1),mε1;nε2)-relaxed-secure, where m is the number of ciphertexts and n is
the number of DIE instances, provided that the basic DIE protocol is ε2-simulatable.
Sometimes we must also prove that knowledge of f(α,β) is equivalent to the
knowledge of f1(α,β),...,fs(α,β), i.e., design a protocol for f based on generic
operations. As for 1024-bit Paillier and 2−80-server-privacy, we can transfer 393 bits
in the individual DIE reply whenever the number of DIE instances is less than 240, the
resulting protocols are really efﬁcient.
Oblivious Transfer. Recall that a 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT) protocol imple-
ments an ideal functionality f(α;β1,...,βn) = βα if α ∈ {1,...,n} and ⊥ other-
wise. Already in [AIR01], the authors showed that such a protocol can be expressed as
a forked composition of n individual DIE protocols:
– release β1 if α = 1,
. . .
– release βn if α = n.
Therefore,weget arelaxed-secureimplementationofoblivioustransferbyusingProt.1
to implement all instances of DIE protocols. Moreover, a client can use any CPIR pro-
tocol to obliviously choose the αth reply of the DIE. Hence, we have just described a
generic transformation from any CPIR to a relaxed-secure oblivious transfer.
An alternative approach was taken by Chang [Cha04] who proved that the basic
DIE protocol from [AIR01] leaks at most βα1 mod p1 and βα2 mod p2 whenever
the plaintext order is a product of two primes p1 and p2. In the corresponding1-out-of-
n OT protocol an honest client has to encrypt values that depend on the secret key and
thus the client-privacy does not follow directly from IND-CPA security.
Millionaire’s protocol with logarithmic communication. The millionaire’s problem
is: given client’s private input α and server’s private input x, decide whether α > x.
Although numerous solutions have been proposed for this problem, none of the pro-
posals is completely satisfactory. For example, the two-message protocol of Blake and
Kolesnikov [BK04] is server-secure only in the semihonest model since encrypted in-
puts must be in correct range, it can leak information otherwise. To solve that type of14 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
problems,consideracircuitCDSprotocolforapublicsetSx = {α ∈ {0,1}
m : α > x}.
Writing α bit by bit (αm−1,...,α0), we obtain
ΨSx(α) =([αm−1
? =1] ∧ [xm−1
? =0])∨
([αm−1
? =xm−1] ∧ [αm−2
? =1] ∧ [xm−2
? =0])∨
([αm−1
? =xm−1] ∧ [αm−2
? =xm−2] ∧ [αm−3
? =1] ∧ [xm−3
? =0]) ∨ ···∨
([αm−1
? =xm−1] ∧ [αm−2
? =xm−2] ∧ ··· ∧ [α1
? =x1] ∧ [α0
? =1] ∧ [x0
? =0]) .
Here, every row corresponds to one conjunctive afﬁne equality test. Fig. 1 depicts the
corresponding unoptimised circuit. Now consider the modiﬁed protocol where β0 is
a publicly ﬁxed `-bit secret and the server randomly reorders the leaf CDS replies
a1,...,am. Finally, the client outputs 1 if one of the recovered CDS outputs is β0.
As the formula ΨSx(α) is a disjunction of afﬁne zero tests, then in the ideal world,
the client learns a randomly shufﬂed set {β0,⊥,...,⊥} if α > x and {⊥,⊥,...,⊥}
otherwise. Hence, the modiﬁed protocol is server-private even if x is private and we
have obtained a relaxed-secure solution to the millionaire problem that fails with prob-
ability 2−`. The total communication of our solution is 2m ciphertexts, the client’s
computation is Θ(m) and the server’s computation is Θ(m2), and we only assume that
the underlyingadditively homomorphiccryptosystem is IND-CPA secure. The server’s
workload can be reduced Θ(m) as in the Blake-Kolesnikov protocol, if we ﬁrst crypto-
compute a recursion ti = (αi − xi)ri + ··· + (αm−1 − xm−1)rm−1 for ri ← ZN and
then re-randomise it by crypto-computingui = tisi for si ← ZN.
Interestingly enough, one can view our solution as an efﬁcient generalisation of the
Fischlin protocol [Fis01]. The latter can be alternatively described as a CDS protocol
based on additively homomorphic cryptosystem over Z2. Due to the small message
space, the Fischlin’s protocol requires a parallel run of ` protocols to achieve the same
reliability as our protocol, i.e., our protocol is ` times more efﬁcient.
Conditional OT. In a conditional oblivious transfer protocol for public predicate Ψ,
the client has a private input α and the server has a private input (x,β0,β1). The client
obtains β1 if Ψ(α,x) = 1 and β0 otherwise. Assume that the master secret β is recon-
structed identically for the circuits without witnesses Ψ and ¬Ψ and the reconstruction
process and the number of true leaves leaks nothing about x except Ψ(α,x). In partic-
ular, assume that the master secret can be reconstructed from randomly shufﬂed shares.
Let BΨ(α,x) and B¬Ψ(α,x) be the shufﬂed CDS replies in the ideal world. Then given a
shufﬂed set of sets {BΨ(α,x),B¬Ψ(α,x)}, one can learn only βΨ(α,x) and nothing more,
provided that the number of leaf tests is equal |BΨ(α,x)| = |B¬Ψ(α,x)|.
This leads to the following COT protocol. First, the server assigns β0 to ¬Ψ and
β1 to Ψ and adds trailing zeroes to leaf secrets of one circuit and trailing ones to the
remaining sub-secrets. Next, the server constructs replies for each leaf CDS and sends
randomly shufﬂed replies back. Finally, the client restores sets BΨ(α,x) and B¬Ψ(α,x)
andreconstructsβΨ(α,x).Thefailureprobabilityisboundedby2−k·L(Ψ)wherek isthe
number of trailing zeroes and ones. Since [α > x] and [α ≤ x] have such symmetrical
circuits, we can construct a COT protocol for [α > x] and for many other relations.A New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 15
Electronicvotingand auctionswithoutrandom oracles. E-votingandauctionproto-
cols based on homomorphic encryption [CGS97,DJ01,LAN02] are natural extensions
of homomorphic two-message protocols, since the secret key is known by the elec-
tion tallier (or a coalition of talliers) to whom the server forwards the second mes-
sage. In such protocols, conditional disclosure of secrets can be used to guarantee se-
curity of the election authority against malicious voters and a semihonest server. As
in [BGN05], consider an electronic voting protocol where every voter sends an encryp-
tion ci ← Encpk(vi) to talliers. We assume that the protocolis secure if vi ∈ S for some
publicly known set S; this is true in typical e-voting protocols [CGS97,DJ01].
In the existing protocols, it is usually assumed that every voter accompanies his or
her vote with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that vi ∈ S. Instead, the talliers
can jointly apply the CDS protocol, with output secret 0, to ci (this can be done very
efﬁciently if S is the set of powers of a ﬁxed integer) and then threshold-decrypt the
result. If the plaintext is equal to 0, talliers accept the vote as correct. Of course, every
step of the talliers has to be accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof of correctness (to
each other and to every possible outside observer), but since the number of talliers is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the number of voters, this is doable in practise, see [BGN05].
Astheresult,wegetavoter-private,universallyveriﬁableandrobuste-votingscheme
where the voters only have to perform one encryption, assuming only that there exists
an IND-CPA secure additively homomorphic public-key cryptosystem. The same trick
can be used to eliminate the need for random oracles in a similar electronic auction
scheme of [LAN02] and in many other similar protocols. Compared to the protocols
of [BGN05], our protocols are more efﬁcient since they are based on genuine addi-
tive homomorphic cryptosystem whereas [BGN05] uses a lifted version of ElGamal
and thus there one has to compute discrete logarithms. Moreover, their cryptosystem is
secure under less established security assumptions.
Multiplicative relations and polynomial arithmetic Finally, we illustrate the power
of using auxiliary witnesses. It is well known that multiplicative relation [z
? =xy] does
not have a compact NNF. However,we can still construct efﬁcient circuit CDS protocol
by introducinga suitable witness w. Let x,y ∈ {0,1}
m andz ∈ {0,1}
2m be sent to the
server by individually encrypting each bit of x,y,z and let w0,...,wm−1 be auxiliary
variables such that wi = xyi. Then xy = w0 + 2w1 + ··· + 2m−1wm−1 and the
formula Ψ[z=xy] can be expressed as a conjunction of tests: (1) xm−1,...,x0 ∈ {0,1},
(2)[yi
? =0]∧[wi
? =0]∨[yi
? =1]∧[wi
? =x] fori ∈ {0,...,m − 1}and xis crypto-computed
as x0 + ··· + 2m−1xm−1, and (3) [z
? =w0 + ··· + 2m−1wm−1].
Several papers, see e.g. [KS05], use additively homomorphic two-message proto-
cols in a setting where one encrypts the coefﬁcients of some polynomials, where the
important quantity is the set of roots of this polynomial. For example, if F1 is the set
of roots of f1(x) and F2 is the set of roots of f2(x) then F1 ∪ F2 is the set of roots of
f1(x) · f2(x). Consequently, we can also construct a CDS protocol for the set to prove
that g(x) = f1(x) · f2(x), as the ith coefﬁcient gi = f10f2i + ··· + f1if20. Now, we
can also verify that for some sets F1, F2 and G, it holds that F1 ∪ F2 = G.16 Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
7 Theoretical Implications
Although we stated our results in the PKI model, where a trusted key generator gen-
erates a key pair (sk,pk) ← Gen and privately transfers (sk,pk) to the client and pk
to the server, they can be easily implemented in the standard model. Namely, we can
eliminate the PKI assumption if the client executes once, separately and in an isolated
manner (that is, no other messages of different protocols are sent by the client at the
same time), with every server a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that pk is valid
and that he knows the corresponding secret key. This is followed by the real protocol.
In the security proof, the simulator extracts the secret key by rewinding and thereafter
continues to work as previously. Since we require statistical server-security—and thus
can use an unboundedsimulator—thenit is actually sufﬁcientto have a zero-knowledge
proofthat the keyis correct:the simulatorjust computesthe secret keycorrespondingto
the (correct) public key. It is even irrelevant whether the client computes the public key
with a correct distribution, since for the proof we only need the existence of the secret
key. Therefore, the amortised message complexity is still two-messages in the standard
model, as the veriﬁcation of a public key must be carried out only once.
It is well known that secure two-party protocols require at least three messages,
therefore, it is impossible to obtain full security of two-message protocols in the ma-
licious model. In fact, one cannot achieve more than relaxed-security in two messages
even in the PKI model. Consequently, the CDS-transformation presented in Sect. 5
is a universal round-optimal transformation from semihonest model to relaxed-secure
model whenever the ﬁrst message contains only ciphertexts. Moreover, computational
and communication resources are linear in the size of the circuit that is needed to test
a validity of an input. More formally, assume that for sets Sm of m-bit strings exists
a polynomial-size formula Ψ(α,w) such that α ∈ Sm iff ∃w : Ψ(α,w) = 1. Then
there exists also a polynomial-size formula Ψ(α,w) in a negation normal form such
that α ∈ Sm iff ∃w : Ψ(α,w) = 1. Therefore, there exist a family of polynomial-time
CDS protocolsfor an arbitraryset S in NP/poly. Such protocolscan be automatically
generated in polynomial time for every set S that can be described by any NP relation.
Alternative classical round-preservingmethods that guard against malicious clients
are based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, i.e., we have to either rely on ran-
domoracles oruse the commonreferencestring (CRS) model.While CRS is a plausible
model for protocol design, constructingefﬁcient non-interactivezero-knowledgeproto-
cols for NP in the CRS model has been a long-standingopen problem.Thus, our result
is also appealing from the complexity-theoreticalviewpoint.
As stated already in Sect. 6, the DIE-based OT protocol leads to a general trans-
formation from CPIR to information-theoretically server-private OT, as the client can
use the CPIR protocol to fetch only the answer of the αth DIE protocol. In particu-
lar, there exists a generic CPIR construction for any IND-CPA secure additively ho-
momorphic cryptosystem [Ste98] with sublinear-but-superpolylogarithmic communi-
cation. Therefore, there exists also an OT protocol with comparable communication
under the sole assumption that IND-CPA secure additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tems exists. Under the assumption that IND-CPA secure length-ﬂexible additively ho-
momorphic cryptosystem exist, one can construct a CPIR protocol [Lip05] with com-
municationΘ(k·log
2 n+`·logn) where k is the security parameter.Consequently,weA New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets And Its Applications 17
can constructan OT with communicationΘ(k·log
2 n+`·logn), if an IND-CPA secure
length-ﬂexible additively homomorphic cryptosystem exists. Finally due to the results
of Gentry and Ramzan [GR05], there also exists an OT protocol with optimal commu-
nication Θ(logn + ` + k), if we assume that Φ-Hiding is hard and that an IND-CPA
secure additively homomorphic cryptosystem exists.
Another two-message OT protocol was proposed by Kalai [Kal05]. Her protocol is
secureinthestandardmodel,whereasourprotocolrequiresazero-knowledgeproofthat
the public key is valid. On the other hand, the query of Kalai’s protocol does not consist
of ciphertexts and thus cannot be used for the CDS protocol. Moreover, Thm. 3 holds
even with incorrectly formed pk provided that the corresponding encryption rule is ad-
ditively homomorphicand it is still possible to detect invalid ciphertexts. Therefore,we
can omit the zero-knowledge proofs for pk provided that we can verify that the plain-
text orderdoes not havetoosmall factors.Forsmall enoughγ andpublicplaintextorder
this can be done efﬁciently by using Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Method, see App. A for
further details. Hence, it is possible to achieve two messages as non-amortised round-
complexity in the standard model under stronger computational assumptions.
Finally,notethatsmalldetectablefactorsofN canbeeffectivelyeliminated.Namely,
a server can eliminate a known factor p by multiplying a ciphertext Encpk(x) with
Encpk(pr) for r ← ZN. Then the client can learn only a coset x + pZN, i.e., we have
established a new cryptosystem over a new message space ZN/pZn ' ZN/p.
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A Non-interactive Partial Public Key Validation
Next, we propose another technique to transform the proposedprotocols to be secure in
the the standard model. It does not need extra messages but needs an extra amount of
computations by an honest server. Namely, Thm. 3 holds even with incorrectly formed
pk provided that the corresponding encryption rule is additively homomorphic and it
is still possible to detect invalid ciphertexts. In particular, the Paillier cryptosystem is
homomorphic even if a public modulus N is incorrectly formed. Thus, the veriﬁca-
tion of pk can just consist of computing a lower bound γ on factors of N. For small
enoughγ this can be done efﬁciently by using Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Method [Len87]
which works in time exp((
√
2 + o(1))
√
lnp · lnlnp) where p is the smallest factor of
N [ZD06]. If we want the server’s computation to be polynomial in logN then we
have to take a sufﬁciently small `. To provide some concrete numbers note that ECM
allows “efﬁcient” detection of 88-bit factors. Assume that the desired server-privacy
level is 2−40. Such a choice of ε2 is most probably sufﬁcient in practise. Then, in the
case of the DIE protocol, one has ` = 47, which is sufﬁcient for several applications. In
Spring 2006,we veriﬁed this approachby using the suggested optimal parameters from
[Zim06b], on an AMD Athlon 64 3000+ processor by using the GMP-ECM software.
As an example, if N = pq, where p is an 88-bit prime and q is an (1024 − 88)-bit
prime then one has to run the ECM algorithm on an expected 206 curves with bounds
B1 = 50000 and B2 = 5000000. Testing on one curve with these parameters takes
approximately 2.5 seconds, and thus testing that the smallest factor is greater than 289
takes 9 minutes on average. On the other hand, if q is an 66-bit prime then it takes an
expected 77 curves with bounds B1 = 11000 and B2 = 1100000. On the same plat-
form, testing one curve with these parameters takes approximately 0.66 seconds and
checking the bound 267 takes 51 seconds on average. Given the advances in the ECM,
we would expect the quoted timings to decrease dramatically over the next few years.